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1Competition, Innovation and Increasing Returns
I shall be concerned, in this article, with the way in which competition operates when there is
a high rate of innovation and when production is subject to increasing returns. These two
circumstances, as one might expect, are frequently found together; a high rate of innovation, as
with pharmaceutical and software, frequently entails heavy costs of development or design,
which are independent of the subsequent volume of output. These cases are important, and
perhaps increasingly so; nevertheless, much of the analysis will apply also to industries where
scale economies arise, not from high original or "set-up" costs, but from other factors. 
No one can reasonably doubt the pervasiveness, in  industry generally, of increasing returns.
Adam Smith was certainly aware of it when he said that the division of labour is limited by the
extent of the market, having observed that, where the scale of an economic activity increases,
it will become practicable for component processes within it to be separated out. In general, the
cost savings made available by an increase in the scale of a particular economic activity do not
manifest themselves uniformly in all its stages and, as a result, an increase in demand may lead,
not to an increase in the size of the enterprise undertaking the activity, nor to an increase in the
number of such enterprises, but to a change in industrial structure, those stages exhibiting the
greatest scale economies becoming the business of specialist suppliers. Smith went so far as to
make the inter-relationship between  the division of labour and the extent of the market the
premise upon which to base what we would now call a theoryof self- sustaining economic
growth, of growth associated with a continuous mutation in the structure of industry; increasing
output both permitting, and being promoted by, the specialisation needed to realise scale
economies. 
It is worth observing that, for this reason, Smith's vision of the working of a market economy
is quite profoundly different from that embodied in the formal models, based on universally
decreasing returns to scale, that may appear to be in the line of descent. Economists, since the
neo-classical development of their subject, have been inclined to regard the phenomenon of
increasing returns, whatever its importance in practice, as analytically inconvenient. They saw
that, if perfect competition were to be preserved, each firm must experience rising marginal costs
while its output is still small relative to that of the whole industry. And, for it to be making a
profit, marginal cost must be not less than average cost. Given these conditions, average cost
cannot be falling with output, or, in other words, increasing returns cannot obtain. 
It appeared, therefore, that if the growth of the firm was not to be checked by rising costs, it had
to be checked by falling demand. A firm enjoying increasing returns could be in equilibrium, that
is to say, only if it were faced by a sloping demand curve, with marginal revenue less than price.
2 J.R. Hicks, Value and Capital, Clarendon Press, Second Edition 1946.1
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Only by sacrificing the assumption of perfect competition was it possible, it seemed, for a firm
experiencing increasing returns to be in profitable equilibrium.  
In this connection, John Hicks famously expressed  the view
 
that " a general abandonment of the
assumption of perfect competition...must have very destructive consequences for economic
theory". He thought it "only possible to save something from this wreck - and it must be
remembered that the threatened wreckage is that of the greater part of general equilibrium theory
- if we an assume that the markets confronting most of the firms with which we shall be dealing
do not differ very greatly from perfectly competitive markets" . This was the course which he1
himself followed, and most economists, implicitly or explicitly, have done likewise.  
Chamberlin chose another path, ensuring the compatibility of competition and increasing returns
by allowing each firm to have a monopoly of its own product, that product however being in
competition with close substitutes. He then proceeded to show that firms in this situation, given
sufficient pressure from the closely competing substitutes, would, in equilibrium, earn only the
normal level of profits associated with competitive markets, the difference being that price would
be equal to unit cost while unit cost was still falling with output . 2
Chamberlin certainly provided us with an account of competitive markets more realistic than that
offered by the theory of perfect competition.  It was, however, more in harmony with an earlier
tradition. The differentiation of activity it postulates is none other than a division of labour as
practised among firms, the scope for which, according to Smith, was limited only by the extent
of the market. In this respect Chamberlin's model differs radically from that of perfect
competition, which, by requiring many firms to be engaged on identical activities, is in effect a
denial of Smith's principle. But although Chamberlin allies himself with Smith in this respect, yet
he places himself within the neo-classical tradition by virtue of his commitment to traditional
equilibrium analysis. So long as we focus upon the properties of static equilibria, product
differentiation is required if competition is to be compatible with increasing returns. I shall hope
to show that, if we consider instead the processes of chang themselves, it becomes apparent that
there are other circumstances able to ensure this result. 
In the competitive equilbrium envisaged in models of both perfect and monopolistic competition,
the marginal revenue from the sale of a product is equal the marginal cost of its production, and
its price is equal to average cost. In the perfect competition equilibrium, average cost is at a
minimum, whereas in monopolistic competition it is above this level. In both cases, rates of
3output are being equated to rates of demand, on the assumption that both will be maintained
indefinitely.
That this steady state assumption is highly unrealistic need hardly be said. Many, if not most
products are launched in the expectation that they will have a limited life, either because they are
superseded by a superior products, or simply because they go out of fashion. Durable goods, in
particular, may be expected to have a particular pattern of sale, first rising as the demand for
them builds up, and then, at best, falling to replacement level only. A software developer, for
example, will certainly not think in terms of adjusting the rate of sales of a  product to some
hypothetical, constant and continuing rate of demand. He will think instead of the total quantity
of sales that can be achieved before a new, superior product comes to dislodge his own; indeed,
he may be already planning to bring out such a product, in order to forestall others from doing
so. There will be no place in his thinking for cost and demand curves of the kind featuring in the
models of competition we have been considering.
It is necessary to recognise the analytical limitations of demand and costs curves as we normally
employ them. Implicit in their use is the assumption that the demand and cost conditions which
they graphically represent are independent of each other, which is the case, however, only so
long as the steady state is assumed, only so long, that is to say, as the postulated rates of demand
can be assumed to persist indefinitely. On this assumption, the depreciation allowances that enter
into costs will depend only on the physical life of the fixed equipment - although even here
realism would make this itself dependent on rates of utilisation. Once we allow the demand for
a good to be limited in time, depreciation allowances may depend, not on the physical durability
of fixed equipment, but on the period for which it will be required. The average cost of the
product will, where this is so, will depend on the total sales realised during its life time. 
These circumstances lead us to envisage the co-existence of increasing returns with competition
of a rather special kind. This may be made more readily apparent if we imagine a rather extreme
and improbable situation in which one seller gains a total, but temporary, monopoly of a product.
In the absence of any close substitutes, it might at first appear that the supplier would be able
to earn a super-normal, monopoly profit. But this need not be so, as it is possible for a new
product to come to replace the established one after an interval sufficiently short to permit the
latter to yield only a normal profit. The price of the product would then, in the event, equal its
average cost, in that total sales revenue equalled total costs incurred; if we wish to imagine this
outcome to have been foreseeable, we can think of the fixed costs of the product being written
off through depreciation allowances that are based on a correct estimate of the duration of the
demand for it. 
4Innovation and Industry Evolution by David B. Audretsch, MIT Press, 19953
We should not think, moreover, that such an outcome could occur only by chance. If we assume
free competition, this would be the outcome generally to be expected. Investment in the industry,
in freely competitive conditions, should tend towards the level at which, on average, products
earned only normal profits, allowing for risk. But we have to think of the tendency to normal
profits as arising, in the case we are considering, not through competitive investment which
increases the supply of a product to match demand for it, but through competitive investment
which displaces the existing product by an improved one. We have to think of investment, not
in productive capacity, but in product development. For an entrepreneur engaged in the activities
needed to identify, develop and test a product able to displace the incumbent one, his
expectation of profit will depend on how he perceives his chances of effecting this displacement,
and on how long he believes he can hold the position gained. 
It is surely desirable for us to accept, in our formal theorising, that, in modern economies at
least, by far the most important mode of competition is that based on development and
innovation, whether in product or process. We concentrate too much, I believe, on monopoly
revenue being obtained by the restriction of supply, and as threatened by entrants who might
increase that supply. With that approach, it is natural for us to ask, for example, whether scale
economies represent a barrier to entry, in that an entrant would have to produce, in order to
achieve a competitive cost level, a volume of output which, if added to the industry's current
output, would cause the market to be over-supplied. I do not doubt that considerations of this
kind have some role to play, but it is much more common for firms to be challenged, not head
on, but by those with something new to offer. It is for this reason, I suspect, that business men
feel the world they live in to be much more competitive than economists appear to thnk it is, and
for this reason that the industrial landscape can change so much in so short a time. David
Audretsch  has shown just how great this change has been and how rapidly it appears to be3
accelerating. It took two decades for a third of the Fortune 500 to be replaced between 1950 and
1970, only one decade for a third to be replaced between 1970 and 1980 and only five years for
a third to be replaced between 1980 and 1985. Equally striking has been the way in which a
number of the most famous corporate giants, such as IBM, US Steel, RCA and Wang have lost,
in his words, "their aura of invincibility", while new firms have emerged and risen to prominence.
 
I have chosen initially to postulate a highly unrealistic and limiting form of competition (which
one might think of as sequential rather than concurrent), a form of competition which operates
only through innovation, one particular product being assumed to obtain a total but temporary
monopoly of its product class until a new product replaces it. Only by undertaking this
replacement itself could the producing firm maintain its hold on the market, and even in these
5circumstances, the threat of competition, if strong enough, could oblige that firm to incur
development expenses at a level which left it with only normal profits. I chose this case in order
to show that competition, normal profits and increasing returns, could in this way all be
compatible, even without assuming, as did Chamberlin, the simultaneous co-existence of a group
of close substitutes. Chamberlin's competing monopolist occupies a niche in (economic) space,
whereas we have been considering the possibility of occupying a niche in tim. Reality exhibits
something of both modes of competition, but conforms to neither. And it is worth while
examining why.
In the special case of purely "sequential" competition which I chose to consider, one product
was imagined to enjoy a total monopoly in the market for its product class until displaced by
another. This is, however, clearly unrealistic in that, although a new product may be superior to
an old one in all respects, the process of replacement would very rarely be immediate. We cannot
legitimately proceed from the assumption that the new product is uniformly superior, to the
conclusion that it will be straight away, and by everyone, so perceived. Only too often analytical
confusion results from implicitly assuming that what the model builder postulates to be
objectively the case, is believed to be the case by the economic agents within the model. What
these agents do will depend on their subjective perceptions of reality, and, where a new product
is concerned, its properties will generally  become manifest only after time and trial. 
The marketing of a new product will therefore take time, and, of course, money. As demand for
it builds up, productive capacity will have to be enlarged. Computer software presents an
interesting and limiting case in which the sales that can be realised  ( in this case of licenses ) are
not subject to this capacity limitation, which is one reason, but not the only reason, why software
products can sometimes very rapidly gain or lose market share. In general, however,
manufactured products will gain market share only gradually, as their merits become apparent
and as the capacity to produce them is built up. During this period, rival offerings will still be on
the market, and their life may be prolonged somewhat by price reductions that go some way to
offset their disadvantages. Meanwhile, a new product, ready to challenge the one gaining
ground, will be under development. 
For these reasons, and despite increasing returns, one would expect several products to be
selling at the same time, and not merely because differentiation gave to each of them its own
group of loyal consumers. A plurality of products could remain in competition, even if they were
objectively homogeneous. The configuration obtaining would not however be an equilibrium of
the kind associated with Chamberlin's monopolistic competition. In that model, as in the
perfectly competitive one, several producers will continue to compete in the market place, so
long as demand and cost conditions do not change. In the case that I have been discussing, a
plurality of producers obtains precisely because these conditions are in constant flux.
6Given free competition there is likely to exist, in this case, a tendency towards what we may call
a dynamic equilibrium, a tendency, that is to say, for the rate of investment in product
development to rise or fall towards the level at which this investment yields only a normal return.
The qualification dynamic may serve to remind us that, in the situation we are describing,
competition causes the profits of firms within an industry to tend towards a normal level, albeit
with a great dispersion about the mean, not by the usual adaptation of supply to demand, but
through variations in the rate of innovative activity. 
Dynamic equilibrium, for the reasons I have given, is consistent with the co-existence of a
number of competing firms, all of them supplying, in conditions of increasing return, products
for the same general market.  In reality of course, a market typically supports several firms
because they are differentiated as well as because of what, for want of a better term, we might
call the life-cycle effect that results from continuous development. One should not imagine that
the co-existence of several firms, when it depends on the latter effect, and does not therefore
constitute static equilibrium of the kind associated with the theories of either perfect or
monopolistic competition, is for that reason somehow necessarily impermanent. The conditions
favouring this co-existence - scope for innovation, uncertainty as to the properties of new
products, the time taken to market a product and to build up the capacity to produce it - are
unlikely themselves to be transitory. 
The perfect competition model, it has frequently been observed, offers a paradox, in that it
represents markets as tending towards a condition, the static equilibrium condition, from which
the very activities which, in ordinary usage, represent competition are necessarily absent. In
equilibrium, producers, as well as consumers, are mere price takers, unable, ex hypothesi, to
improve their existing products or offer new ones. Competition is seen as reaching its
apotheosis, one might almost say, when it all but ceases to exist. The maintenance of a plurality
of firms in dynamic equilibrium, by contrast, depends on continuously active  competition in all
its dimensions. 
But might it not be argued that the simultaneous co-existence in this way of a number of
competing, objectively homogeneous offerings, each produced under increasing returns, depends
not on the intensity of competition, but on its imperfection ? Without imperfect knowledge, all
demand would switch to the best product within the particular market, and without imperfect
mobility of resources, the supply of that product would appropriately respond. There would exist
only one producer of each product variety, as in the equilibrium associated with monopolistic
competition. 
On the face of it, this logic may seem convincing. If everyone always knew everything, and if
processes were timeless, continuing competition of the kind I have described  would indeed not
7This matter is discussed at length in Part I of my book: Information and Investment, Clarendon Press,4
Oxford, 1990
exist, but neither of course would any economic order that we can possibly imagine. Any model
based on the assumption that perfect knowledge and perfect resource mobility universally prevail
is objectionable, not because it is obviously unrealistic, but because it would be impossible. An
economy in which these conditions obtain obviously does not exist, and, less obviously, could
not do so. Where the actions of economic agents are inter-dependent, it is illogical to assume
that each one of them is free to do whatever he or she likes without constraint, while at the same
time having perfect knowledge of what all the others will do .4
We must now consider whether a state of dynamic equilibrium would require there to be
imperfection of a different kind, imperfection in the sense of the restraint in price competition
characteristic of oligopoly. It has, after all, long been accepted that several competing goods,
each being produced under increasing returns, might co-exist on the market place provided the
firms making them were to exercise this restraint. In the situation hypothesised, each producer
assumes that his rivals would match any reduction in his price, thus denying him any increase in
market share. His sales would therefore increase only in accordance with the elasticity of demand
for the product as a whole, rather than the elasticity of demand for his particular offering, if
measured on the assumption that the prices of the competing products remained unchanged. In
these circumstances, producers might not reduce price; several firms would stay in business,
despite the fact that they were each experiencing increasing returns.
Behaviour of this sort may be responsible for the survival of a number of competing firms each
making the same product under increasing returns, but it is by no means a necessary condition.
In any case, a firm has reasons not to avoid price reductions other than the likelihood that
competitors will match them. It was noted that a firm bringing in a new product cannot expect
its properties, or even its existence, to be known to everyone in the market; time will be needed
to undertake effective marketing and to build up the needed reputation. And even if demand
could be created instantaneously and without cost, the capacity required to meet it cannot
normally be so created. In these circumstances, the firm will not expect too much from a price
reduction, even if the suppliers of competing products do not retaliate. A price reduction will
not be seen, in other words, as a short- cut to increasing sales, an alternative to a time
consuming and expensive marketing effort. The possibility of a dynamic equilibrium, ith several
suppliers in the market, does not depend on the kind of tacit collusion on prices associated with
oligopoly.
It may be helpful, at this stage, to take stock of where the argument has reached. It is obvious,
to all those who wish to see, that, in the real world, competition does co-exist with increasing
returns to scale. Chamberlin's theory of monopolistic competition offered product differentiation
8Marshall, Alfred. Principles of Economics Book V, Chapter V. No one, it seems to me, had a better sense5
than did Marshall of the way in which equilibrium analysis in economics is made difficult by the element
of time, and more awareness of the dangers run in this field by those who, in his language “follow their
mathematics boldly”. And, as has frequently been observed, his treatment anticipates a host of subsequent
developments. I am inclined to think that both the importance of high, fixed, development costs and the
rate of product development is faster now than when he wrote the Principles. Perhaps it is for this reason
that he does not explicitly consider equilibrium in terms of the rate of investment in innovation, but
perhaps it was because he thought, as he put it that “...such notions must be taken broadly. The attempt
to make them precise over-reaches our strength.”
as providing one explanation; each firm enjoys a monopoly in the particular variety it puts on
offer, but competition from close substitutes may establish a normal rate of profit. In equilibrium,
unit costs are falling with output, but so is the level of demand; the demand curve, in other
words, is tangential to the average cost curve. 
I have suggested that there may be co-existence for a further, different reason. In industries
where there is continuous development and innovation, - the difference between these, in this
context, being one of degree - existing products are subject to displacement by new ones, the
rate of investment in development tending, in competitive conditions, towards the level at which
the life span of products is no longer than permits, on average, normal profits to be earned. The
result of this process, typically, will be to leave several producers in the market, not only because
they cater to different needs, but because it takes time for new products to gain ground and for
old ones to be driven from the field.
In these circumstances, I believe that we are justified in talking in terms of a tendency towards
a dynamic equilibrium. Product  innovation generally requires investment, which will be
undertaken in the hope of profit; in a regime of economic freedom, therefore, one should expect
large and sustained divergences between the return on such investment to create signals and
incentives which will cause them to be reduced.  It goes without saying that, in real life
conditions, this tendency will manifest itself in only a very approximate manner, but this is not
to say that it will not manifest itself at all. Common observation shows, in a broad way, how free
competition causes resources to flow in response to perceived profit opportunities, and there is
no reason to regard investment in innovation or development as different in this regard from
investment undertaken to increase the amount of different goods being supplied.
It may be objected, however, that the term equilibrium is misapplied to the state of affairs which
I have sought to describe, in that it attributes stability to a state of constant flux. But for the use
of this language, there is an illustrious  precedent. The long -run equilibrium of an industry, as
defined by Marshall, is consistent with the rise and decline of firms within it, hence his famous
analogy with the trees of a forest and the use he made of the concept of the "representative
firm" . Dynamic equilibrium has obvious similarities to this state, but relates, not to the volume5
9F. H. Hahn, On the Notion of Equilibrium in Economics, Cambridge University Press, 1973.6
In order more fully to explain the course of industrial development, the process of innovation would need7
to be subject to closer analysis. A familiar distinction could be made between radical innovation, of which
the microprocessor would be an example, and routine innovation of the kind that I have been discussing.
The former can be regarded as desequilibriating, and may give rise to abnormally high profits, whereas
the latter is undertaken, by most firms most of the time, in order to earn a normal profit.
in which a product or group of products is supplied, but to the rate at which their development
proceeds. 
We have to accept, in fact, that there are different kinds and levels of equilibrium. The total
supply of a product may, in Marshall's account, be in equilbrium with the demand for it, while
the firms within the industry, which may be expanding or contracting, are not. Similarly, the rate
of investment in innovation within an industry may be in equilibrium, in the sense that the
prevailing expectation of profit provides no inducement to increase or reduce it, while the plans
made by firms within the industry, in respect of both the nature and the quantities of the goods
they make, are frequently being revised.
It might be said that the process of competition, as I have described it, is one of permanent
disequilibrium, the natural tendency towards monopolisation of a market, which one would
expect increasing returns to create, being continuously frustrated by the emergence of a new
product. And if we are to regard innovation as essentially exogenous, such an account of the
matter would be acceptable. I certainly do not wish to deny that it may frequently be appropriate
to describe the evolution of industry in terms of reaction to random shocks. But there are surely
many industries in which all firms recognise that they must continuously invest in product
development in order to survive. In these industries, the displacement of existing products by
new ones will not come as a surprise; the event will be consistent with the expectations held and
in no way represent their disappointment. Professor Hahn has proposed a definition in saying
that "an economy is in equilibrium when it generates messages that do not cause agents to
change the theories which they hold or the policies which they pursue" . And if one were to6
accept such a definition, then my use of the term, albeit in a special dynamic context, would
seem to be justified. The coexistence of competition and increasing returns could be described
as a disequilibrium phenomenon only within the framework of comparative statics. If further
product development were somehow suddenly impossible, then Sraffa's logic would apply and
this coexistence would break down. But this framework is surely inappropriate where
uninterrupted product development is the normal, and universally expected, state of affairs. In
that context, it seems to me that we should be concerned with the equilibrium rate of investment
in development, with the tendency for the actual rate prevailing in a particular industry to vary
so as to bring the expected financial yield into line with that prevailing generally .7
10
It may be argued that investment in product development may not create a tendency toward a
normal rate of return, as I have suggested, for the reason that incumbent firms are better able
successfully to undertake it. They will be familar with the relevant technology and their existing
position in the market will make new offerings made by them more readily acceptable than those
of outsiders. No doubt this is true, but such advantages are hardly the stuff of which  anti-social
monopolistic protection can for long be made. There is a good deal of historical experience to
show that those who have become expert in doing something one way may well not be the first
to observe that it could better be done some other way, and to show also that an established
reputation may sap the energy and weaken the initiative of those who seek shelter behind it. We
have to ask ourselves, moreover, whether any advantages of incumbency, any sluggishness is the
process of competition, is to be deplored. It is certainly desirable tht control over resources
should move to successful from unsuccessful firms, but we should not want the process of
transfer to be more rapid than the natural mobility of resources can make efficiently possible.
Some academic observers would seem to believe that inter-firm competition should approximate
to some ancient gladiatorial display, the resultant carnage proving how well it works. Those
within industry have a livelier sense of the genuine social losses associated with closure and
redundancy, and not just because their jobs are at stake. 
I have been concerned with the way in which competition operates where there are increasing
returns to scale and a high rate of innovation. These conditions, of course, are not universal, and
the analytical framework I have sketched out does not therefore universally apply. But we should
not expect competition always to work in the same way, whether in the supply of computers or
of cocoa beans. I mentioned, at the outset, pharmaceuticals and software, where competition
most obviously takes the form I have described. In both industries, indeed, the investment called
for is overwhelmingly in development, in which we should include expensive and time
consuming testing procedures, and in marketing. There can be no question but that this
investment, no less than investment in manufacturing capacity, is undertaken on the basis of
expected financial return. The expectations will be highly uncertain and, in consequence, realised
returns will show great variation. The spectacular returns earned from some software proucts
come easily to mind, but it is well to remember also the many which have failed. 
It may be questioned whether, given the great uncertainty associated with the return to
investment in development, it makes sense to suppose that any equilibrium tendency is at work.
No doubt there is wide variation in the realised profits from this investment, both within and
between industries, but free competition is as likely in this activity, as in others, to prevent large
differences persisting over time. Whatever the qualifications that we find it necessary to make,
we accept that, in a regime of economic freedom, the pattern of output will accord, in some
reasonable degree, with what people are prepared to pay, and the processes of production, in
some reasonable degree, will make efficient use of the needed scarce resources. For the same
11
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1, Chapter 3, translated by Terence Irwin, Hackett Publishing8
Company, 1985.
reason, there is a presumption that, under the influence of the profit motive, the pattern of
investment in product development will accord, if only approximately, with the value that
consumers will place on different developments. And even the total value of such inestment
activity will  be influenced, if only very loosely, by how much consumers are prepared to pay for
novelty.
The reader, lamenting the looseness of this argument, may look back, with longing, to the clarity
and precision of formal models. He may recall, with sympathy, Sir John Hicks's view, referred
to above, that a general abandonment of perfect competition must have very destructive
consequences for economic theory. But, as I have endeavoured to show elsewhere, the claims
of the perfect competition model are completely spurious, as its internal logic is fatally flawed.
I hope ( and believe ) that the argument which I have sketched above can be developed more
fully and with greater rigour, but, in the end, we may have to accept Aristotle's view that "Our
discussion will be adequate if its degree of clarity fits the subject -matter, for we should not seek
the same degree of exactness in all sorts of arguments alike" .8
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